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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades public passenger transport authorities around the world have
increasingly turned to competitive mechanisms to deliver their services. It might have been
expected that the United States, with its reputation for free markets, would be a leader in the
field. But this has not been the case. Because of federal laws favoring existing public transport
operating procedures and the nuances of special interest influence in US politics, conversion to
competitive tendering has been very contentious and slow. Less than 10 percent of US public
transport bus service is competitively tendered, a considerably lower figure than in the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Australia  and New Zealand, for example.
This paper reviews research on us competitive tendering and provides the first comprehensive
cost analysis of competitive tendering relative to non-competitive government production of
public transport bus service in the United States. It includes all 1995 data available (not a sample)
with respect to all metropolitan areas with more than one million population as of 1995. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Over the past 15 years, a number of studies have estimated the cost impacts of public transport
bus service competitive tendering in the United States. Generally these studies have found
competitive operation to be less costly than non-competitive. For example:
Roger Teal, Genevieve Giuliano and Edward K. Morlok, Public Transit Service1
Contracting Report prepared for the United States Department of Transportation,
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, 1986.
Price Waterhouse, Bus Service Continuation Project: Fiscal Year 1988-892
Evaluation Report (1991).
1988 legislation required Denver’s public transport agency to competitively tender3
20 percent of its bus service. The legislative mandate was expanded to 35 percent
in 1999.
Wendell Cox, Janet E. Kraus and Subhash R. Mundle, Competitive Contracting of4
Transit Services: The Denver Experience, presented to the 5  Internationalth
Conference on Competition and Ownership in Passenger Transport (Leeds), May
1997 and the Transportation Research Board (Washington), January 1997.
Examples are New Orleans, Miami and St. Louis.5
Wendell Cox, Jean Love and Nick Newton, Competition in Public Transport:6
International State of the Art, paper presented to the 5  International Conferenceth
on Competitive and Ownership in Passenger Transport (Leeds), May 1997.
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• Teal, Giuliano and Morlok found competitive cost savings in a 1986 review of US cases,
which was the broadest research to date.1
• In an independent audit of a major Los Angeles competitive tendering project, Price
Waterhouse reported  cost savings of 60 percent savings per vehicle kilometer and2
improved service quality.
• Denver’s mandatory competitive tendering program  was found to have resulted in 25.63
percent higher bus service levels, while operating costs increased only 3.0 percent (1988
to 1995, inflation adjusted). In contrast, during the six years before competitive
contracting, operating costs rose 18.8 percent, while service levels were increased by 17.5
percent.4
• Virtually all of the public transport agencies in the United States that have competitive
tendered service have done so with the intention of reducing costs. Internal public agency
analyses have invariably identified cost savings and in the few cases where competitive
tendering has been abandoned, the impetus was either trade union political pressure or
trade union concessions.5
These studies mirror the international experience in both bus and rail competitive tendering,  and6
mirrors the general results that would be predicted by economic theory for substitution of
Elliot Sclar, Paying More, Getting Less: The Denver Experience with Bus7
Privatization: 1990-1995, report prepared for the Amalgamated Transit Union,
AFL-CIO/CLC, February 1997.
This is the only mandatory competitive tendering program in the United States.8
In the 1994 procurement, the last before the Sclar analysis, the public transport9
agency required contractors to provide new buses, with an option for the buses to
be purchased by the public transport agency at the end of the contract term. That
asset transfer has now taken place. The National Transit Database does not
generally include capital costs. Capital costs are sometimes included where they
are a part of a contract cost paid to another operator by the public transport
agency. Even in these cases, however, the National Transit Database does not
report such costs explicitly, and as a result they cannot be directly derived.
This research was considered and not considered convincing by the Colorado10
legislature in 1999 when the competitive tendering mandate was expanded to 35
percent. The driving factor in this decision was the cost savings that had been
documented in a number of studies, including Cox-Kraus-Mundle, KPMG Peat
Marwick and the public transport agency itself.
William Shelton McCulloughj III, Brian D. Taylor and Martin Wachs, Transit11
Service Contracting and Cost Efficiency, Paper presented to the Transportation
Research Board (Washington), 1998.
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competition for monopoly.
More recently, studies have been published that reach different conclusions:
• Elliot Sclar  found competitive costs in Denver’s legislatively mandated program  to be7 8
higher than non-competitive costs. Sclar calculated overhead costs at approximately
double the normal rate, including costs normally associated with non-competitive service
in overhead instead, did not adjust for competitive capital costs mandated by the public
transport agency  and not reported in non-competitive costs, and used a base year that did9
not precede the beginning of the competitive tendering program.10
• Recently William Shelton McCullough, Brian Taylor and Martin Wachs published an
analysis of contracted and non-contracted US public transport bus services in 1993,11
which generally found costs at public transport agencies that do not contract for bus
service to be lower than agencies that contract for some or all of their bus services.
Superficially, such a finding appears to contradict the research indicating that competitive
tendering results in cost savings and the general economic theory that competition is more
efficient than monopoly. For that reason, the McCullough-Taylor-Wachs (MTW) research
Non-competitive contracts include Boston, Baltimore, Worcester, Pioneer Valley12
(all Massachusetts) and Suffolk County (New York).
Minneapolis-St. Paul13
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is considered in greater detail.
The McCullough-Taylor-Wachs Research
A number of methodology issues make it inappropriate to characterize the MTW research as
measuring differences between the costs of US competitively tendered and non-competitive bus
services.
1. MTW compares the costs of contracted services to the cost of non-contracted services.
Contracted services are those purchased by a government agency from another
organization. Non-contracted services are those produced by the government agency
itself. Some of the services included in the MTW sample are non-competitively
contracted.  At least one competitively tendered service is included as a non-contracted12
service.  MTW tends to compare government versus private operation of services, rather13
than competitive versus non-competitive operation (Tables #1 and #2).
Table #1
McCullough-Taylor-W achs
Contracted and Non-Contracted Sample Characteristics
Operator Non-Competitive Competitive
Government (1) Non-Contracted (2) Non-Contracted
Private Sector  (3) Contracted (4) Contracted
Table #2
Competitive and Non-Competitive Sample Characteristics
Operator Non-Competitive Competitive
Government (1) Non-Competitive (2) Competitively Tendered
Private Sector (3) Non-Competitive (4) Competitively Tendered
2. MTW compares the combined contracted and non-contracted cost per service (revenue)
hour of three samples of operators --- (1) agencies that do not contract for bus services,
(2) agencies that contract for some bus services and (3) agencies that contract for all of
their bus services. The MTW analysis, however, does not measure the difference between
competitive and non-competitive operating costs within either individual public transport
This dynamic is illustrated by a “reductio ad absurdum” analysis. The high cost14
Seattle public transport agency contracted approximately five percent of its bus
service. For contracted service to reduce the agency’s average cost per hour to the
$45.74 MTW “no contracting” average would have required the contract
operators to pay the agency approximately $2,300 per hour.
Wendell Cox, VIA Metropolitan Transit Opportunity Analysis (San Antonio, TX:15
Texas Public Policy Foundation), 1997. 
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agencies or metropolitan areas. Use of the combined cost indicator is less precise a
comparison of contracted and non-contracted costs. In some public transport agencies, the
percentage of contracted services is so low that could have only minuscule impact on
overall public transport agency costs.  In addition, administrative cost at public transport14
agencies may vary by up to $14 per vehicle hour,  which makes it impossible to measure15
the financial impact of contracted service through an examination of combined contract
and non-contract costs.
3. The MTW “no contracting” sample is characterized by much smaller public transport
agency sizes than the “some contracting” sample (Table #1). The median size no-
contracting public transport agency is 16 buses. Moreover, the “no contracting” sample
excludes high cost large public public transport agencies that do not contract, such as the
New York City Transit Authority and the Chicago Transit Authority (Table #3). The
median sized public transport agency in the “some contracting” sample is a more
representative 233 buses and this sample contains a much higher representation of the high
cost larger public operators. 
Table #3
McCullough-Taylor-Wachs
Distribution of Public Transport Agencies by Number of Buses
Range of Buses No Some
Contracting Contracting
1-24  58  0
25-49  15  3
50-99  4  5
100-249  3  8
250-499  4  2
500-999 0  7
1000+  2  0
Median of Sample 16  233
Cost per Revenue Hour $45.74 $66.84
Median Number of Buses 16  233
Median is in # of Buses Range: 1-24 100-249
Range: Cost per Revenue Hour $43.13 $68.00
Table #3
McCullough-Taylor-Wachs
Distribution of Public Transport Agencies by Number of Buses
Examples include Denver, Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul.16
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MTW Cost Compared to Range Cost 6.1% -1.7 %
Because US public transport agencies are characterized by substantial diseconomies of
scale (Table #3), it the MTW research appears to reflect differences in agency sizes more
than differences in contracting practice (Table #4).
Table #4
Average Cost per Revenue Hour by 
Size of Bus System: 1993
Number of Buses 1993 Average Cost
 per Revenue Hour
1000+  $84.68
500-999  $77.26
250-499  $68.00
100-249  $61.59
50-99  $60.82
25-49  $49.33
1-24  $43.13
MTW’s “no contracting” cost per revenue hour of $45.74 is within seven percent of the
average cost for agencies in the 1 to 25 bus category ($43.13). The paper’s $66.84 cost
per revenue hour for the “some contracting” sample is within two percent of the $68.00
for agencies in the 100-249 bus classification. MTW could well measure the cost impacts
of size more so than the impact of contracting. 
4. Some agencies in the “some” and “all” contracting sample have contracting costs that
include bus capital. Capital costs, however, are not included in the National Transit
Database for non-contracted services. This tends to overstate the cost of contracted
services.16
5. Cost per revenue hour (in service hour) is not a sufficiently indicative cost measure.
Revenue hour costs are output costs dependent upon policy decisions have nothing to do
with contracting or the lack of it (the design of bus routes by the agency). The revenue
hour cost indicator places competitive operators at a disadvantage, since a
disproportionate share of peak period express services is operated competitively. In 1995,
competitively tendered services in metropolitan areas of more than one million population
had revenue hour per vehicle hour ratios of 0.815, while non-competitive services had
ratios of 0.888. This disparity could account to a five to ten percent contracting
Data obtained from the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis-St. Paul and the city17
of Indianapolis.
Other services in the Phoenix metropolitan area are competitively tendered.18
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disadvantage. A preferable (input) indicator is cost per vehicle hour (total hours). The cost
of service to the public transport agency is more dependent upon the number of vehicle
hours than on the number of revenue hours. 
6. There is considerable difference in the major metropolitan area (more than 1 million)
components of each of the samples. The “none” sample has only a 21.8 percent major
metropolitan representation. The “some” and “all” samples have representations more than
three times as high (Table #5). Costs, especially labor costs, tend to be lower outside
major metropolitan areas, which would have the effect of skewing the results in favor of
the “none” sample and against the “all” and “some” sample. Nearly 90 percent (87.4
percent) of public transport bus riders are carried on services within metropolitan areas of
more than one million persons.
Table #5
McCullough-Taylor-Wachs
Sample Size & Number in Metropolitan Areas of More than
1,000,000 Population
Sample  Sample Size  In Major Major
Metropolitan Metropolitan
Areas Share
All Contracted 29 20  69.0%
None Contracted 87 19  21.8%
Some Contracted 25 18  72.0%
Total  141  57  40.4%
THE COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH: 1995
The research reported in this paper includes all identified instances of public transport bus
competitive tendering in the 43 metropolitan areas with a population of more than one million in
1995. The primary data source was the United States Department of Transportation Federal
Transit Administration National Transit Database. Additional data was obtained from public
transport policy organizations for services in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Indianapolis, which were
not reported to the National Transit Database.17
Bus competitive tendering excludes both non-competitive contract service and any competitive
tendering in which the public transport agency mandates labor arrangements, such as wages or
benefits beyond the dictates of the labor laws that generally apply to commercial enterprises (such
as management contracting as occurs at Phoenix Transit  and the Greensboro, North Carolina18
With respect to data obtained from the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis-St.19
Paul competitively tendered services are assumed to have 1.15 vehicle hours and
vehicle kilometer per each service vehicle hour and vehicle kilometer respectively.
No adjustment is made to account for non-competitive capitalization of operating20
costs.
Vehicle capital costs are excluded in Denver based a detailed analysis in a 199521
Management Report for the Regional Transportation District. (Mundle and
Associates and Wendell Cox Consultancy).
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public transport agency).
Competitive tendering occurs in 30 of the 43 metropolitan areas. Non-competitive services, most
operated directly by public transport agencies, occur in 42 of the 43 metropolitan areas (all
services in Las Vegas are competitively tendered).
• The universe reviewed includes the 123 non-competitive and 77 competitively tendered
services in metropolitan areas with more than one million population. These services are
administered by 161 public transport agencies, and represent 87.4 percent of all US public
transport bus ridership.19
• Some competitively tendered services reported in the National Transit Database include
vehicle capital costs. In contrast, no capital costs are included in non-competitive
operating costs and some maintenance costs are capitalized (resulting in an understatement
of operating costs).  A 10 percent cost reduction is applied to competitive costs where20
vehicle capital costs are included.21
• Administrative costs are allocated to non-competitive and competitive services based upon
an allocation of vehicle kilometer and vehicle hour related costs. 
• A composite cost comparison was developed, using a weighting of cost per vehicle hour
and cost per vehicle kilometer calculated at the individual public transport agency level
using the ratio of vehicle operations and vehicle maintenance costs. 
Cost per Vehicle Hour: 
The cost per vehicle hour comparison yields the following results (Table #6 and Figure #1):
• Based upon aggregate service levels, competitively tendered services are 30.8 percent less
expensive per vehicle hour than non-competitive services.
• Based upon an mean average of individual metropolitan area data, competitively tendered
9services are 25.4 percent less expensive per vehicle hour than non-competitive services.
Figure 1
Cost per Vehicle Kilometer
The cost per vehicle kilometer comparison yields the following results (Table #7 and Figure #2):
• Based upon aggregate service levels, competitively tendered services are 47.4 percent less
expensive per vehicle kilometer than non-competitive services.
• Based upon an mean average of individual metropolitan area data, competitively tendered
services are 39.5 percent less expensive per vehicle kilometer than non-competitive
services.
Without the 10 percent capital cost adjustment, the national average savings22
figures would decline by less than one percent.
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Figure 2
Composite Cost Comparison 
The composite cost comparison, calculated using a weighting (above) of individual service cost
per vehicle hour and cost per vehicle kilometer ratios, yields the following results (Table #8 and
Figure #3):
• Based upon aggregate service levels, competitively tendered services are 35.4 percent less
expensive in composite costs than non-competitive services.
• Based upon an mean average of individual metropolitan area data, competitively tendered
services are 33.1 percent less expensive per vehicle kilometer than non-competitive
services.22
Competitive costs are lower than non-competitive costs in all 30 metropolitan areas in which
In the metropolitan areas in which the cost differences are the least (Seattle,23
Houston and Austin), tender awards since 1995 have enlarged the cost differential.
Houston Metro competitively tendered a complete operating division in 1996 (150
buses). Agency staff estimates the savings at more than 35 percent. The Seattle
competitively tendered peak-hour express services (Snohomish County) have been
retendered (1997), resulting in a cost per hour reduction of 19 percent from the
previous contract, which would increase the cost differential between competitive
and non-competitive costs. Retendering of Denver services since 1995 have
reduced competitive costs per vehicle hour by more than 15 percent (Internet:
www.publicpurpose.com/ut-dencc99.htm).
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public transport bus service is competitively tendered.23
Figure 3
Conclusion
Consistent with previous US and international research, the good faith efforts of US public
transport agencies to administer competitive service delivery have produced cost savings.
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Table #6
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Table Bus Service Costs per Vehicle Hour
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
Metropolitan Area State(s)  Competitively Non-Competitive Cost Difference Percentage
Tendered Competitively
Tendered
 Aggregate Average (Total Service Level)  $47.98  $69.30  -30.8%  6.4%
 Metropolitan Area Average  $45.15  $60.55  -25.4%  8.1%
 Atlanta  GA  $44.57  $57.69  -22.7%  4.6%
 Austin  TX  $52.32  $58.43  -10.5%  29.3%
 Boston  MA-NH  $50.08  $83.03  -39.7%  7.0%
 Buffalo  NY  $60.68  0.0%
 Charlotte  NC-SC  $37.16  $49.70  -25.2%  4.3%
 Chicago  IL-IN-WI  $50.28  $69.43  -27.6%  3.6%
 Cincinnati  OH-KY  $54.23  0.0%
 Cleveland  OH  $27.49  $67.70  -59.4%  0.3%
 Columbus  OH  $63.94  0.0%
 Denver  CO  $46.92  $62.32  -24.7%  24.5%
 Detroit  MI  $36.38  $72.43  -49.8%  1.2%
 Dallas-Ft. Worth  TX  $52.81  $72.43  -27.1%  22.5%
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point  NC  $38.27  0.0%
 Hartford  CT  $41.55  $59.29  -29.9%  5.6%
 Houston  TX  $67.95  $61.61  10.3%  3.1%
 Indianapolis  IN  $27.26  $56.40  -51.7%  21.5%
 Kansas City  MO-KS  $42.47  $62.48  -32.0%  5.1%
 Los Angeles  CA  $48.96  $73.57  -33.5%  9.9%
 Las Vegas  NV-AZ  $34.00  100.0%
 Memphis  TN-AR  $44.61  0.0%
 Miami  FL  $36.81  $60.52  -39.2%  3.7%
 Milwaukee  WI  $49.33  $55.60  -11.3%  2.2%
 Minneapolis-St. Paul  MN-WI  $53.44  $59.51  -10.2%  14.4%
 New Orleans  LA  $70.17  0.0%
Table #6
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Table Bus Service Costs per Vehicle Hour
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
Metropolitan Area State(s)  Competitively Non-Competitive Cost Difference Percentage
Tendered Competitively
Tendered
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 Norfolk  VA  $41.22  0.0%
 Nashville  TN  $47.55  0.0%
 New York  NY-NJ-CT-PA  $63.00  $77.21  -18.4%  2.4%
 Orlando  FL  $47.59  0.0%
 Pittsburgh  PA  $48.47  $67.49  -28.2%  1.5%
 Philadelphia  PA-NJ  $25.69  $74.93  -65.7%  0.9%
 Phoenix  AZ  $31.07  $55.14  -43.7%  26.4%
 Portland  OR-WA  $45.31  $62.10  -27.0%  0.6%
 Providence  RI-MA  $55.62  0.0%
 Rochester  NY  $59.56  0.0%
 Sacramento  CA  $55.44  $68.57  -19.1%  5.7%
 San Antonio  TX  $42.12  0.0%
 San Diego  CA  $32.53  $52.04  -37.5%  20.4%
 Seattle  WA  $70.80  $72.74  -2.7%  5.7%
 San Francisco  CA  $53.74  $78.01  -31.1%  11.0%
 Salt Lake City  UT  $47.83  0.0%
 St. Louis  MO-IL  $32.15  $53.04  -39.4%  5.2%
 Tampa-St. Petersburg  FL  $43.35  $50.28  -13.8%  1.4%
 Washington-Baltimore  DC-MD-VA-WV  $53.06  $76.22  -30.4%  3.5%
Calculated from National Transit Database, Metropolitan Council (Minneapolis-St. Paul) data and city of Indianapolis data.
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Table #7
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Bus Service Costs per Vehicle Kilometer
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
Metropolitan Area State(s)  Compe-titively Non-Competitive Cost Percentage
Tendered Difference Competitively
Tendered
 Aggregate Average (Total Service Level)  $1.78  $3.38  -47.4%  8.4%
 Metropolitan Area Average  $1.63  $2.79  -39.5%  10.0%
 Atlanta  GA  $1.57  $2.66  -40.9%  6.0%
 Austin  TX  $2.09  $2.72  -23.3%  32.6%
 Boston  MA-NH  $1.52  $4.27  -64.5%  11.3%
 Buffalo  NY  $3.21  0.0%
 Charlotte  NC-SC  $1.41  $2.21  -36.2%  5.0%
 Chicago  IL-IN-WI  $1.81  $3.89  -53.4%  5.5%
 Cincinnati  OH-KY  $2.40  0.0%
 Cleveland  OH  $0.90  $3.16  -71.3%  0.5%
 Columbus  OH  $2.86  0.0%
 Denver  CO  $1.77  $2.47  -28.1%  25.4%
 Detroit  MI  $1.53  $3.06  -49.9%  1.2%
 Dallas-Ft. Worth  TX  $1.66  $3.05  -45.5%  28.0%
 Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point  NC  $1.68 0.0%
 Hartford  CT  $1.49  $2.75  -45.9%  7.1%
 Houston  TX  $1.52  $2.44  -37.8%  5.4%
 Indianapolis  IN  $1.15  $2.38  -51.7%  21.5%
 Kansas City  MO-KS  $1.53  $2.87  -46.6%  6.4%
 Los Angeles  CA  $1.69  $3.45  -51.0%  13.0%
 Las Vegas  NV-AZ  $1.68  100.0%
 Memphis  TN-AR  $1.96  0.0%
 Miami  FL  $1.53  $2.79  -45.1%  4.1%
 Milwaukee  WI  $1.62  $2.74  -41.0%  3.3%
 Minneapolis-St. Paul  MN-WI  $2.06  $2.77  -25.7%  16.9%
 New Orleans  LA  $3.54  0.0%
Table #7
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Bus Service Costs per Vehicle Kilometer
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
Metropolitan Area State(s)  Compe-titively Non-Competitive Cost Percentage
Tendered Difference Competitively
Tendered
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 Norfolk  VA  $1.80  0.0%
 Nashville  TN  $2.06  0.0%
 New York  NY-NJ-CT-PA  $2.73  $4.49  -39.2%  3.2%
 Orlando  FL  $2.06  0.0%
 Pittsburgh  PA  $1.47  $2.97  -50.7%  2.2%
 Philadelphia  PA-NJ  $0.78  $4.39  -82.2%  1.7%
 Phoenix  AZ  $1.25  $2.41  -48.1%  28.0%
 Portland  OR-WA  $1.88  $2.75  -31.6%  0.6%
 Providence  RI-MA  $2.27  0.0%
 Rochester  NY  $2.99  0.0%
 Sacramento  CA  $1.95  $2.95  -34.0%  6.9%
 San Antonio  TX  $1.78  0.0%
 San Diego  CA  $1.42  $2.22  -35.8%  20.0%
 Seattle  WA  $2.28  $2.88  -20.7%  6.9%
 San Francisco  CA  $1.87  $3.69  -49.5%  14.5%
 Salt Lake City  UT  $1.68  0.0%
 St. Louis  MO-IL  $1.16  $2.28  -49.3%  6.2%
 Tampa-St. Petersburg  FL  $1.71  $2.12  -19.4%  1.5%
 Washington-Baltimore  DC-MD-VA-WV  $1.81  $3.85  -53.0%  5.2%
Calculated from National Transit Database, Metropolitan Council (Minneapolis-St. Paul) data and city of Indianapolis data
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Table #8
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Table Bus Service Costs: Composite 
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
 Metropolitan Area  State(s)  Cost  Percentage of  Vehicle Hours  Vehicle
Difference Service Allocation Kilometers
Competitively Allocation
Tendered
 Aggregate Average (Total Service Level)  -35.4%  7.0%  71.9%  28.1%
 Metropolitan Area Average  -33.1%  8.4%  73.4%  26.6%
 Atlanta  GA  -27.6%  5.0%  73.1%  26.9%
 Austin  TX  -14.0%  30.2%  72.8%  27.2%
 Boston  MA-NH  -46.9%  8.3%  70.9%  29.1%
 Buffalo  NY  0.0%  70.2%  29.8%
 Charlotte  NC-SC  -28.2%  4.5%  72.5%  27.5%
 Chicago  IL-IN-WI  -34.7%  4.1%  72.3%  27.7%
 Cincinnati  OH-KY  0.0%  71.5%  28.5%
 Cleveland  OH  -62.5%  0.4%  73.9%  26.1%
 Columbus  OH  0.0%  76.5%  23.5%
 Denver  CO  -25.8%  24.8%  67.7%  32.3%
 Detroit  MI  -49.8%  1.2%  64.2%  35.8%
 Dallas-Ft. Worth  TX  -32.1%  24.0%  72.7%  27.3%
 Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point  NC  0.0%  76.8%  23.2%
 Hartford  CT  -34.0%  6.0%  74.6%  25.4%
 Houston  TX  -6.1%  3.9%  66.0%  34.0%
 Indianapolis  IN  -51.7%  21.5%  75.0%  25.0%
 Kansas City  MO-KS  -36.2%  5.5%  71.1%  28.9%
 Los Angeles  CA  -38.0%  10.7%  74.1%  25.9%
 Las Vegas  NV-AZ  100.0% 100.0%
 Memphis  TN-AR  0.0%  74.8%  25.2%
 Miami  FL  -40.7%  3.8%  75.1%  24.9%
 Milwaukee  WI  -18.0%  2.4%  77.3%  22.7%
 Minneapolis-St. Paul  MN-WI  -14.0%  15.0%  75.5%  24.5%
Table #8
Competitive and Non-Competitive Public Transport Table Bus Service Costs: Composite 
US Metropolitan Areas of More than 1,000,000 Population in 1995
 Metropolitan Area  State(s)  Cost  Percentage of  Vehicle Hours  Vehicle
Difference Service Allocation Kilometers
Competitively Allocation
Tendered
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 New Orleans  LA  0.0%  64.0%  36.0%
 Norfolk  VA  0.0%  74.1%  25.9%
 Nashville  TN  0.0%  73.0%  27.0%
 New York  NY-NJ-CT-PA  -24.6%  2.7%  70.5%  29.5%
 Orlando  FL  0.0%  76.2%  23.8%
 Pittsburgh  PA  -34.8%  1.7%  70.4%  29.6%
 Philadelphia  PA-NJ  -70.2%  1.1%  72.6%  27.4%
 Phoenix  AZ  -45.0%  26.8%  70.3%  29.7%
 Portland  OR-WA  -28.1%  0.6%  75.8%  24.2%
 Providence  RI-MA  0.0%  74.3%  25.7%
 Rochester  NY  0.0%  68.5%  31.5%
 Sacramento  CA  -22.6%  6.0%  76.6%  23.4%
 San Antonio  TX  0.0%  77.0%  23.0%
 San Diego  CA  -37.1%  20.3%  75.2%  24.8%
 Seattle  WA  -7.8%  6.0%  71.5%  28.5%
 San Francisco  CA  -36.0%  12.0%  73.1%  26.9%
 Salt Lake City  UT  0.0%  72.1%  27.9%
 St. Louis  MO-IL  -42.2%  5.5%  71.8%  28.2%
 Tampa-St. Petersburg  FL  -15.1%  1.4%  76.5%  23.5%
 Washington-Baltimore  DC-MD-VA-WV  -36.5%  4.0%  73.0%  27.0%
